Although the k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity models have led to a number of valuable privacy-protecting techniques and algorithms, the existing solutions are currently limited to static data release.
INTRODUCTION
When person-specific data is published, protecting individual respondents' privacy is a top priority. Among various approaches addressing this issue, the k-anonymity model [12, 10] and the ℓ-diversity model [8] have recently drawn significant attention in the research community. In the k-anonymity model, privacy protection is achieved by ensuring that every record in a released dataset is indistinguishable from at least (k − 1) other records within the dataset. Thus, every respondent included in the dataset corresponds to at least k records in a k-anonymous dataset, and the risk of record identification (i.e., the probability of associating a particular individual with a released record) is guaranteed to be at most 1/k. While the k-anonymity model primarily focuses on the problem of record identification, the ℓ-diversity model, which is built upon the kanonymity model, addresses the risk of attribute disclosure (i.e., the probability of associating a particular individual with a sensitive attribute value). As an attribute disclosure may occur without records being identified (e.g., due to lack of diversity in a sensitive attribute), the ℓ-diversity model, in its simplest form * , additionally requires that every group of indistinguishable records contain at least ℓ distinct sensitive attribute values; thereby the risk of attribute disclosure is bound to at most 1/ℓ. * We discuss more robust ℓ-diversity requirements in Section 2.
Although these models have yielded a number of valuable privacy-protecting techniques [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11] , existing approaches only deal with static data release. That is, all these approaches assume that a complete dataset is available at the time of data release. This assumption implies a significant shortcoming, as in many applications data collection is rather a continuous process. Moreover, the assumption entails "one-time" data dissemination. Obviously, this does not address today's strong demand for immediate and upto-date information, as the data cannot be released before the data collection is considered complete.
As a simple example, suppose that a hospital is required to share its patient records with a disease control agency. In order to protect patients' privacy, the hospital anonymizes all the records prior to sharing. At first glance, the task seems reasonably straightforward, as existing anonymization techniques can efficiently anonymize the records. The challenge is, however, that new records are continuously collected by the hospital (e.g., whenever new patients are admitted), and it is critical for the agency to receive up-to-date data in timely manner.
One possible approach is to provide the agency with datasets containing only the new records, which are independently anonymized, on a regular basis. Then the agency can either study each dataset independently or merge multiple datasets together for more comprehensive analysis. Although straightforward, this approach may suffer from severely low data quality. The key problem is that relatively small sets of records are anonymized independently so that the records may have to be modified much more than when they are anonymized together with previous records [3] . Moreover, a recoding scheme applied to each dataset may make the datasets inconsistent with each other; thus, collective analysis on multiple datasets may require additional data modification. Therefore, in terms of data quality, this approach is highly undesirable. One may believe that data quality can be assured by waiting for new data to be accumulated sufficiently large. However, this approach may not be acceptable in many applications as new data cannot be released in a timely manner.
A better approach is to anonymize and provide the entire dataset whenever it is augmented with new records (possibly along with another dataset containing only new records). In this way, the agency can be provided with upto-date, quality-preserving and "more complete" datasets each time. Although this approach can also be easily implemented by using existing techniques (i.e., anonymizing the entire dataset every time), it has a significant drawback.
That is, even though each released dataset, when observed independently, is guaranteed to be anonymous, the combination of several released datasets may be vulnerable to various inferences. We illustrate these inferences through some examples in Section 3.1. As such inferences are typically made by comparing or linking records across different tables (or versions), we refer to them as cross-version inferences to differentiate them from inferences that may occur within a single table.
Our goal in this paper is to identify and prevent crossversion inferences so that an increasing dataset can be incrementally disseminated without compromising the imposed privacy requirement. In order to achieve this, we first define the privacy requirement for incremental data dissemination. We then discuss three types of cross-version inference that an attacker may exploit by observing multiple anonymized datasets. We also present our anonymization method where the degree of generalization is determined based on the previously released datasets to prevent any cross-version inference. The basic idea is to obscure linking between records across different datasets. We develop our technique in two different types of recoding approaches; namely, full-domain generalization [6] and multidimensional anonymization [7] . One of the key differences between these two approaches is that the former generalizes a given dataset according to predefined generalization hierarchies, while the latter does not. Based on our experimental result, we compare these two approaches with respect to data quality and vulnerability to cross-table inference. Another issue we address is that as a dataset is released multiple times, one may need to keep the history of previously released datasets. We thus discuss how to maintain such history in a compact form to reduce unnecessary overheads.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the basic concepts of the k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity models and provide an overview of related techniques. In Section 3, we formulate the privacy requirement for incremental data dissemination. Then in Section 4, we describe three types of inference attacks based on our assumption of potential attackers. We present our approach to preventing these inferences in Section 5 and evaluate our technique in Section 6. We review some related work in Section 7 and conclude our discussion in Section 8.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss the key concepts of the kanonymity and ℓ-diversity models and briefly review related techniques.
Anonymity Models
The k-anonymity model assumes that data are stored in a table (or a relation) of columns (or attributes) and rows (or records). It also assumes that the target table contains  person-specific information and that each record in the table  corresponds to a unique real-world individual. The process  of anonymizing such a table starts with removing all the  explicit identifiers, such as name and SSN, from the table. However, even though a table is free of explicit identifiers, some of the remaining attributes in combination could be specific enough to identify individuals. For example, it has been shown that 87% of individuals in the United States can be uniquely identified by a set of attributes such as {ZIP, gender, date of birth} [12] . This implies that each attribute alone may not be specific enough to identify individuals, but a particular group of attributes together may identify a particular individuals [10, 12] .
The main objective of the k-anonymity model is thus to transform a table so that no one can make high-probability associations between records in the table and the corresponding individuals by using such group of attributes, called quasi-identifier. In order to achieve this goal, the k-anonymity model requires that any record in a table be indistinguishable from at least (k − 1) other records with respect to the quasi-identifier. A set of records that are indistinguishable from each other is often referred to as an equivalence class. Thus, a k-anonymous table can be viewed as a set of equivalence classes, each of which contains at least k records. The enforcement of k-anonymity guarantees that even though an adversary knows the quasi-identifier value of an individual and is sure that a k-anonymous table T contains the record of the individual, he cannot determine which record in T corresponds to the individual with a probability greater than 1/k.
Although the k-anonymity model does not consider sensitive attributes, a private dataset typically contains some sensitive attributes that are not part of the quasi-identifier. For instance, in patient table, Diagnosis is considered a sensitive attribute. For such datasets, the key consideration of anonymization is the protection of individuals' sensitive attributes. However, the k-anonymity model does not provide sufficient protection in this setting, as it is possible to infer certain individuals' attributes without precisely re-identifying their records. For instance, consider a kanonymized table where all records in an equivalence class have the same sensitive attribute value. Although none of these records can be uniquely matched with the corresponding individuals, their sensitive attribute value can be inferred with probability 1. Recently, Machanavajjhala et al. [8] pointed out such inference issues in the k-anonymity model and proposed the notion of ℓ-diversity. Several formulations of ℓ-diversity are introduced in [8] . In its simplest form, the ℓ-diversity model requires that records in each equivalence class have at least ℓ distinct sensitive attribute values. As this requirement ensures that every equivalence class contains at least ℓ distinct sensitive attribute values, the risk of attribute disclosure is kept under 1/ℓ. Note that in this case, the ℓ-diversity requirement also ensures ℓ-anonymity, as the size of every equivalence class must be greater than or equal to ℓ. Although simple and intuitive, modified datasets based on this requirement could still be vulnerable to probabilistic inferences. For example, consider that among the ℓ distinct values in an equivalence class, one particular value appears much more frequently than the others. In such a case, an adversary may conclude that the individuals contained in the equivalence class are very likely to have that specific value. A more robust diversity is achieved by enforcing entropy ℓ-diversity [8] , which requires every equivalence class to satisfy the following condition. where S is the domain of the sensitive attribute and p(e, s) represents the fraction of records in e that have sensitive value s. Although entropy ℓ-diversity does provide stronger privacy, the requirement may sometimes be too restrictive. For instance, as pointed out in [8] , in order for entropy ℓ-diversity to be achievable, the entropy of the entire table must also be greater than or equal to log ℓ.
Anonymization Techniques
The k-anonymity (and ℓ-diversity) requirement is typically enforced through generalization, where real values are replaced with "less specific but semantically consistent values" [12] . Given a domain, there are various ways to generalize the values in the domain. Intuitively, numeric values can be generalized into intervals (e.g., [11 − 20] ), and categorical values can be generalized into a set of possible values (e.g., {USA, Canada, Mexico}) or a single value that represents such a set (e.g., North-America). As generalization makes data more vague, the utility of the data is inevitably downgraded. The key challenge of anonymization is thus to minimize the amount of ambiguity introduced by generalization while enforcing anonymity requirement.
Various generalization strategies have been developed. In the hierarchy-based generalization schemes, a nonoverlapping generalization-hierarchy is first defined for each attribute of quasi-identifier. Then an algorithm in this category tries to find an optimal (or good) solution which is allowed by such generalization hierarchies. Here an optimal solution is a solution that satisfies the privacy requirement and at the same time minimizes a desired cost metric. Based on the use of generalization hierarchies, the algorithms in this category can be further classified into two subclasses. In the single-level generalization schemes [6, 10, 11] , all the values in a domain are generalized into a single level in the corresponding hierarchy. This restriction could be a significant drawback in that it may lead to relatively high data distortion due to unnecessary generalization. The multi-level generalization [4, 5] schemes, on the other hand, allows values in a domain to be generalized into different levels in the hierarchy. Although this leads to much more flexible generalization, possible generalizations are still limited by the imposed generalization hierarchies.
Recently, hierarchy-free generalization schemes [1, 2, 7] have been proposed, which do not rely on the notion of pre-defined generalization hierarchies. In [1] , Bayardo et al. propose an algorithm based on a powerset search problem, where the space of anonymizations (formulated as the powerset of totally ordered values in a dataset) is explored using a tree-search strategies. In [7] , LeFevre et al. transform the k-anonymity problem into a partitioning problem and proposes a greedy approach that recursively splits a partition at the median value until no more split is allowed with respect to the k-anonymity requirement. [2] , on the other hand, introduces a flexible k-anonymization approach which uses the idea of clustering to minimize information loss and thus ensures good data quality.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we start with an example to illustrate the problem of inference. We then describe our notion of incremental dissemination and formally define a privacy requirement for it.
Motivating Examples
Let us revisit our previous scenario where a hospital needs to provide the anonymized version of its patient records with a disease control agency. As previously discussed, to assure data quality, the hospital anonymizes the patient Figure 2 . As shown, the probability of identity disclosure (i.e., the association between individual and record) and attribute disclosure (i.e., the association between individual and diagnosis) are kept under 1/2 in the dataset, respectively. For example, even if an attacker knows that the record of Tom, who is a 21-year-old male, is in the released table, he cannot learn about Tom's disease with a probability greater than 1/2 (although he learns that Tom has either asthma or flu). At a later time, three more patient records (shown in Italic) are inserted into the dataset, resulting the table in Figure 3 . The hospital then releases a new (2, 2)-anonymous table as depicted in Figure 4 . Observe that Tom's privacy is still protected in the newly released dataset. However, not every patient's privacy is protected from the attacker. Example 1. "Alice has cancer!" Suppose the attacker knows that Alice, who is in her late twenties, has recently been admitted to the hospital. Thus, he knows that Alice's record is not in the old dataset in Figure 2 , but in the new dataset in Figure 4 . From the new dataset, he learns only that Alice has one of {Asthma, Flu, Cancer}. However, by consulting the previous dataset, he can easily deduce that Alice has neither asthma nor flu (as they must belong to patients other than Alice). He now infers that Alice has cancer. Example 2. "Bob has alzheimer!" The attacker knows that Bob is 52 years old and has long been treated in the hospital. Thus, he is sure that Bob's record is in both datasets in Figures 2 and 4 . First, by studying the old dataset, he learns that Bob suffers from either alzheimer or diabetes. Now the attacker checks the new dataset and learns that Bob has either alzheimer or heart disease. He can thus conclude that Bob suffers from alzheimer. Note that three other records in the new dataset are also vulnerable to similar inferences.
As shown in the examples above, anonymizing a dataset without considering previously released information may enable various inferences. 
Incremental data dissemination and privacy requirement
Let T be a private table with a set of quasi-identifier attributes Q and a sensitive attribute S. We assume that T consists of person-specific records, each of which corresponds to a unique real-world individual. We also assume that T continuously grows with new records and denote the state of T at time i as Ti. For the privacy of individuals, each Ti must be "properly" anonymized before being released to public. Our goal is to address both identity disclosure and attribute disclosure, and we adopt an anonymity model † that combines the requirements of k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity as follows.
Definition 1. ((k, c)-Anonymity)
Let table T be with a set of quasi-identifier attributes Q and a sensitive attribute S. With respect to Q, T consists of a set of non-empty equivalence classes, where ∀ e ∈ T , record r ∈ e ⇒ r[Q] = e[Q]. We say that T is (k, c)-anonymous with respect to Q if the following conditions are satisfied.
1. ∀ e ∈ T, |e| ≥ k, where k > 0.
∀ e ∈ T, |{r|r∈e∧r[S]=s}| |e|
≤ c, where 0 < c ≤ 1.
The first condition ensures the k-anonymity requirement, and the second condition enforces the diversity requirement in the sensitive attribute. In its essence, the second condition dictates that the maximum confidence of association between any quasi-identifier value and a particular sensitive attribute value in T must not exceed a threshold c.
At a given time i, only an (k, c)-anonymous version of Ti, denoted as Ti, is released to public. Thus, users, including potential attackers, may have access to a series of (k, c)-anonymous tables, T1, T2, . . ., where | Ti| ≤ | Tj| for i < j. As every released table is (k, c)-anonymous, by observing each table independently, one cannot associate a record with a particular individual with probability higher than 1/k or infer any individual's sensitive attribute with † A similar model is also introduced in [14] . confidence higher than c. However, as shown in Section 3.1, it is possible that one can increase the confidence of such undesirable inferences by observing difference between the released tables. For instance, if an observer can be sure that two (anonymized) records in two different versions indeed correspond to the same individual, then he may be able to use this knowledge to infer more information than what is allowed by the (k, c)-anonymity protection. If such a case occurs, we say that there is an inference channel between the two versions.
Definition 2. (Cross-version inference channel) Let Θ = { T1, . . . , Tn} be the set of all released tables for private table T , where Ti is an (k, c)-anonymous version released at time i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let θ ⊆ Θ and Ti ∈ Θ. We say that there exists cross-version inference channel from θ to Ti, denoted as θ Ti, if observing tables in θ and Ti collectively increases the risk of either identity disclosure or attribute disclosure in Ti higher than 1/k or c, respectively.
When data are disseminated incrementally, it is critical to ensure that there is no cross-version inference channel among the released tables. In other words, the data provider must make sure not only that each released table is free of undesirable inferences, but also that no released table creates cross-version inference channels with respect to the previously released tables. We formally define this requirement as follows. 
CROSS-VERSION INFERENCES
We first describe potential attackers and their knowledge that we assume in this paper. Then based on the attack scenario, we identify three types of cross-version inference attacks in this section.
Attack scenario
We assume that the attacker has been keeping track of all the released tables; he thus possesses a set of released tables { T0, . . . , Tn}, where Ti is a table released at time i. We also assume that the attacker has the knowledge of who is and who is not contained in each table; that is, for each anonymized table Ti, the attacker also possesses a population table Ui which contains the explicit identifiers and the quasi-identifiers of the individuals in Ti. This may seem to be too farfetched at first glance; however, we assume the worst case, as we cannot rely on attacker's lack of knowledge. Also, such knowledge is not always difficult to acquire for a dedicated attacker. For instance, consider medical records released by a hospital. Although the attacker may not be aware of all the patients, he may know when target individuals in whom he is interested (e.g., local celebrities) are admitted to the hospital. Based on this knowledge, the attacker can easily deduce which tables may include such individuals and which tables may not. Another, perhaps the worst, possibility is that the attacker may collude with an insider who has access to detailed information about the patients; e.g., the attacker could obtains a list of patients from a registration staff. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the attacker's knowledge includes the list of individuals contained in each table as well as their quasi-identifier values. However, as all the released tables are (k, c)-anonymous, the attacker cannot infer the individuals' sensitive attribute values with a significant probability, even utilizing such knowledge. That is, in each released table, the probability that an individual with a certain quasi-identifier has a particular sensitive attribute is still bound to c. Therefore, the goal of the attacker is to increase his/her confidence of attribute disclosure (i.e., above c) by comparing the released tables all together. In the remainder of this section, we describe three types of cross-version inferences that the attacker may exploit in order to achieve this goal.
Notations
We first introduce some notations we use in our discussion. Let T be a table with a set of quasi-identifer attributes Q and a sensitive attribute S. Let A be a set of attributes, where
denotes the duplicate-eliminating projection of T onto the attributes A. Let ei = {r0, . . . , rm} be an equivalence class in T , where m > 0. By definition, the records in ei all share the same quasi-identifier value, and ei[Q] represents the common quasi-identifier value of ei. We also use similar notations for individual records; that is, for record r ∈ T , r[Q] represents the quasi-identifier value of r and r[S] the sensitive attribute value of r. In addition, we use T A to denote the duplicate-preserving projection of T . For instance, ei S represents the multiset of all the sensitive attribute values in ei. We also use |N | to denote the cardinalities of set N .
Regardless of recoding schemes, we consider a generalized value as a set of possible values. Suppose that v is a value from domain D and v a generalized value of v. Then we denote this relation as v v, and interpret v as a set of values where (v ∈ v) ∧ (∀vi ∈ v, vi ∈ D). Overloading this notation, we say that r is a generalized version of record r, denoted as r r,
Moreover, we say that two generalized values v1 and v2 are compatible, denoted as v1 ⊲⊳ v2, if v1 ∩ v2 = ∅. Similarly, two generalized records r1 and r2 are compatible (i.e., r1 ⊲⊳ r2) if ∀qi ∈ Q, ri[qi]∩ rj[qi] = ∅. We also say that two equivalence classes e1 and e2 are compatible if ∀qi ∈ Q, e1[qi]∩e2[qi] = ∅
Difference attack
Check Difference Attack Input: Two (k, c)-anonymous tables Ti and Tj Output:
true if the two tables are vulnerable to difference attack and false otherwise if (DirectedCheck( Ti, Tj) = true) return true else return DirectedCheck( Tj, Ti) end if Let Ti = {e0,1, . . . , e0,n} and Tj = {e1,1, . . . , e1,m} be two (k, c)-anonymous tables that are released at time i and j (i = j), respectively. As previously discussed in Section 4.1, we assume that an attacker knows who is and who is not in each released table. Also knowing the quasi-identifier values of the individuals in Ti and Tj, for any equivalence class e in either Ti or Tj, the attacker knows the individuals whose records are contained in e. Let I(e) represent the set of individuals in e. With this information, the attacker can now perform difference attack as follows.
The pseudo-code in Figures 5, 6 , and 7 gives an algorithm for checking whether two (k, c)-anonymous tables are vulnerable to the difference attack. The Check Difference Attack procedure in Figure 5 is the main procedure that checks for the vulnerability between two tables bidirectionally.
DirectedCheck
does not satisfy c-diversity return true end if end if for each ℓ ∈ {index + 1, . . . , m} // generates subsets with size |E| + 1 insert (E ∪ e i,ℓ , ℓ) into Q end for end while return false Figure 6 : Algorithm for checking if one table is vulnerable to difference attack with respect to another table
The DirectedCheck procedure in Figure 6 checks if the first table of the input is vulnerable to difference attack with respect to the second table. This procedure enumerates all the subset equivalence class sets of Ti, and for each set E, the procedure calls GetMinSets procedure in Figure 7 to get the minimum set E ′ of equivalence classes in Tj that contains all the records in E. We call such E ′ the minimum covering set of E. The procedure then checks whether there is vulnerability between the two equivalence classes E and E ′ . As the algorithm checks the all the subsets of Ti, the time complexity is apparently exponential (i.e, it is O(2 n ), where n is the number of equivalence classes in Ti). As such, for large tables with many equivalence classes, this brute-force check is clearly unacceptable. In what follows, we discuss a
This also implies that if each E1 and E2 is not vulnerable to difference attack, then neither is any set containing E1 ∪ E2. Based on this observation, we can modify the method in Figure 6 as follows. In each time we union one more element to a subset to create larger subsets, we check if their minimum covering sets are disjoint. If they are, we do not insert the unioned subset to the queue. Note that this also prevents all the sets containing the unioned set from being generated.
Observation 2. Let
In other words, we can skip checking if each of E1 and E2 is vulnerable to difference attack. This is because unless E1 ∪ E2 is vulnerable to difference attack, E1 and E2 must not be vulnerable. Thus, we can save our computational effort as follows. When we insert a new subset to the queue, we check if there exists another set with the same minimum covering set. If such a set is found, we simply merge the new subset to the found set.
Observation 3. Consider the method in Figure 6 . Suppose that Ti was released after Tj; that is, Ti contains some records that are not in Tj. If equivalence class e ∈ Tj contains such records, then we do not need to consider that equivalence class for difference attack.
It is easy to see that if e ∈ Ti contains some record(s) that Tj do not, the minimum covering set of e is an empty-set. Since e itself must be (k, c)-anonymous, e is safe from difference attack. Based on this observation, we can purge all such equivalence classes from the initial problem set. As the method in Figure 5 shows, our algorithm checks two tables in both directions. While it may seem that this doubles the already-heavy computation, this observation relieves such concern.
Intersection attack
The key idea of k-anonymity is to introduce sufficient ambiguity into the association between quasi-identifier values and sensitive attribute values. However, this ambiguity may be reduced to an undesirable level if the structure of equivalence classes are varied in different releases. For instance, suppose that the attacker wants to know the sensitive attribute of Alice, whose quasi-identifier value is qA. Then the attacker can select a set of tables, θ + A , that all contain Alice's record. As the attacker knows the quasi-identifier of Alice, he does not need to examine all the records; he just needs to consider the records that may possibly correspond to Alice. That is, in each Ti ∈ θ + A , the attacker only need to consider an equivalence class ei ⊆ Ti, where qA ei [Q] . Let EA = {e0, . . . , en} be the set of all equivalence classes identified from θ + A such that qA ei[Q], 0 ≤ i ≤ n. As every ei is (k, c)-anonymous, the attacker cannot infer Alice's sensitive attribute value with confidence higher than c by examining each ei independently. However, as every equivalence class in EA contains Alice's record, the attacker knows that Alice's sensitive attribute value, sA, must be present in every equivalence class in EA; i.e., ∀ei ∈ EA, sA ∈ ei S . This implies that sA must be found in set SIA = Ì e i ∈E A ei S . Therefore, if the most frequent value in SIA appears with a probability greater than c, then the sensitive attribute value of Alice can be inferred with confidence greater than c.
Check Intersection Attack
Input: Two (k, c)-anonymous tables T0 and T1 Output:
true if the two tables are vulnerable to intersection attack and false otherwise for each equivalence class e0,i in T0 for each e1,j ∈ T1 that contains any record in e0,i if (e0,i S ∩ e1,j S ) does not satisfy c-diversity return true end if end for end for return false The pseudo-code in Figure 8 provides an algorithm for checking the vulnerability to the intersection attack for given two (k, c)-anonymous tables, T0 and T1. The basic idea is to check every pair of equivalence classes ei ∈ T0 and ej ∈ T1 that contain the same record(s).
Record-tracing attack
Unlike the previous attacks, the attacker may be interested in knowing who may be associated with a particular attribute value. In other words, instead of wanting to know what sensitive attribute value a particular individual has, the attacker now wants to know which individuals possess a specific sensitive attribute value; e.g., the individuals who
T n . . . Figure 9 : Record-tracing attacks suffer from 'HIV+'. Let sp be the sensitive attribute value in which the attacker is interested and Ti ∈ Θ be the table in which (at least) one record with sensitive value sp appears. Although T may contain more than one record with sp, suppose, for simplicity, that the attacker is interested in a particular record rp such that (rp[S] = sp) ∧ (rp ∈ ei). As T is (k, c)-anonymous, when the attacker queries the population table Ui with rp[Q], he obtains at least k individuals who may correspond to rp. Let Ip be the set of such individuals. Suppose that the attacker also possesses a subsequently released table Tj (i < j) which includes rp. Note that in each of these tables the quasi-identifier of rp may be generalized differently. This means that if the attacker can identify from Tj the record corresponding to rp, then he may be able to learn additional information about the quasi-identifier of the individual corresponding to rp and possibly reduce the size of Ip. There are many cases where the attacker can identify rp in Tj. However, in order to illustrate our point clearly, we show some simple cases in the following example.
Example 3. The attacker knows that rp must be contained in the equivalence class of Tj that is compatible with rp [Q] . Suppose that there is only one compatible equivalence class, ei+1 in Tj (see Figure 9 (i) Figure 9 (ii)). Although the attacker may or may not determine which equivalence class contains rp, he is sure that rp ∈ ei+1 ∪ e ′ i+1 ; therefore,
After updating rp[Q] with Tj, the attacker can reexamine Ip and eliminate individuals whose quasi-identifiers are no longer compatible with the updated rp [Q] . When the size of Ip becomes less than k, the attacker can infer the association between the individuals in Ip and rp with a probability higher than 1/k.
In the above example, when there are more than one com- For example, let r1 ∈ ei,1 and r2 ∈ ei,2 be two records in Ti, both taking sr as the sensitive value (see Figure 10 (i)). Suppose that Ti+1 contains a single equivalence class ei+1,1 that is compatible to r1 and two compatible equivalence classes ei+1,1 and ei+1,2 that are compatible to r2. Although r2 has two compatible equivalence classes, the attacker can be sure that r2 is included in ei+1,2, as the record with sr in ei+1,1 must correspond to r1. Figure 10 (ii) illustrates another case of which the attacker can take advantage. As shown, there are two records in ei,1 that take sr as the sensitive value. Although the attacker cannot be sure that each of these records is contained in ei+1,1 or ei+1,2, he is sure that one record is in ei+1,1 and the other in ei+1,2. Thus, he can make an arbitrary choice and update his knowledge about the quasi-identifiers of the two records accordingly. Using such techniques, the attacker can make more precise inference by eliminating equivalence classes in Ti+1 that are impossible to contain rp. We now describe a more thorough algorithm that checks two (k, c)-anonymous tables for the vulnerability to the record-tracing attack. First, we construct a bipartite graph G = (V, E), where V = V1 ∪ V2 and each vertex in V1 represents a record in Ti, and each vertex in V2 represents a record in Ti+1 that is compatible with at least one record in Ti. We define E as the set of edges from vertices in V1 to vertices in V2, which represents possible matching relationships. That is, if there is an edge from ri ∈ V1 to rj ∈ V2, this means that records ri and rj may both correspond to the same record although they are generalized into different forms. We create such edges between V1 and V2 as follows. For each vertex r ∈ V1, we find from V2 the set of records R where ∀ri ∈ R, ′ ∈ E, then we create an edge from r to r ′ and mark it with d , which indicates that r definitely corresponds to r ′ . If |R| > 1, then we create an edge from r and every r ′ i ∈ R and mark it with p to indicate that r plausibly corresponds to r ′ i . Now given the constructed bipartite graph, the pseudo-code in Figure 11 removes plausible edges that are not feasible and discovers more definite edges by scanning through the edges.
Note that the algorithm above does not handle the case illustrated in Figure 10 (ii). In order to address such cases, we also performs the following. For each equivalence class Remove Infeasible Edges Input: A bipartite graph G = (V, E) where V = V1 ∪V2 and E is a set of edges representing possible matching relationships. Figure 11 : Algorithm for removing infeasible edges from a bipartite graph e1,i ∈ Ti, we find from Tj the set of equivalence classes E where ∀e2,j ∈ E, e1,i[Q] ⊲⊳ e2,j [Q] . If the same number of records with any sensitive value s appear in both e1,i and E, we remove unnecessary plausible edges such that each of such records in e1,i has a definite edge to a distinct record in E. After all infeasible edges are removed, each record r1,i ∈ V1 is associated with a set of possibly matching records {r2,j, . . . , r2,m} (j ≤ m) in V2. Now we can follow the edges and compute for each record r1,i ∈ Ti the inferrable quasiidentifier r It is worth noting that the key problem enabling the record-tracing attack arises from the fact that the sensitive attribute value of a record, together with its generalized quasi-identifier, may uniquely identify the record in different anonymous tables. This issue can be especially critical for records with rare sensitive attribute values (e.g., rare diseases) or tables where every individual has a unique sensitive attribute value (e.g., DNA sequence).
INFERENCE PREVENTION
In this section, we describe our incremental data anonymization which incorporates the inference detection techniques in the previous section. We first describe our data/history management strategy which aims to reduce the computational overheads. Then, we describe the properties of our checking algorithms which make them suitable for existing data anonymization techniques such as full-domain generalization [6] and multidimensional anonymization [7] .
Data/history management
Consider a newly anonymized table, Ti, which is about to be released. In order to check whether Ti is vulnerable to cross-version inferences, it is essential to maintain some form of history about previously released datasets, Θ = { T0, . . . , Ti−1}. However, checking the vulnerability in Ti against each table in Θ can be computationally expensive. To avoid such inefficiency, we maintain a history table, H, which has the following attributes.
• RID : is a unique record ID (or the explicit identifier of the corresponding individual). Assuming that each Ti also contains RID (which is projected out before being released), RID is used to join Hi and Ti.
• TS (Time Stamp) : represents the time (or the version number) when the record is first released.
• IS (Inferable Sensitive values) : stores the set of sensitive attribute values with which the record can be associated. For instance, if record r is released in equivalence class ei of Ti,
This field is used for checking vulnerability to intersection attack.
• IQ (Inferable Quasi-identifier) : keeps track of the quasi-identifiers into which the record has previously been generalized. For instance, for record r ∈ Ti,
. This field is used for checking vulnerability to record-tracing attack.
The main idea of H is to keep track of the attacker's accumulated knowledge on each released record. For instance, value r[IS] of record r ∈ Hi−1 indicates the set of sensitive attribute values that the attacker may be able to associate with r prior to the release of Ti. This is indeed the worst case as we are assuming that the attacker possesses every released table, i.e., Θ. However, as discussed in Section 4.1, we need to be conservative when estimating what the attacker can do. Using H, the cost of checking Ti for vulnerability can be significantly reduced; for intersection and record-tracing attacks, we check Ti against Hi−1, instead of every Tj ∈ Θ ‡ .
Incorporating inference detection into data anonymization
We now discuss how to incorporate the inference detection algorithms into secure anonymization algorithms. We first consider the full-domain anonymization, where all values of an attribute are consistently generalized to the same level in the predefined generalization hierarchy. In [6] , LeFevre et al. propose an algorithm that finds minimal generalizations for a given table. In its essence, the proposed algorithm is an bottom-up search approach in that it starts with ungeneralized data and tries to find minimal generalizations by increasingly generalizing the target data in each step. The key property on which the algorithm relies is generalization property: given a table T and two generalization strategies G1, G2 (G1 G2), if G1(T ) is k-anonymous, then G2(T ) is also k-anonymous § . Although intuitive, this property is critical as it guarantees the optimality to the discovered solutions; i.e., once the search finds a generalization level that satisfies the k-anonymity requirement, we do not need to search further.
Observation 4. Given a table T and two generalization strategies G1, G2 (G1 G2), if G1(T ) is not vulnerable to any inference attack, then neither is G2(T ).
The proof is simple. As each equivalence class in G2(T ) is the union of one or more equivalence classes in G1(T ), the information about each record in G2(T ) is more vague than that in G1(T ); thus, G2 does not create more inference attacks than G1. Based on this observation, we modify the algorithm in [6] as follows. In each step of generalization, in addition to checking the (k, c)-anonymity requirement, we also checks for the vulnerability to inference. If either check fails, then we need to further generalize the data.
Next, we consider the multidimensional k-anonymity algorithm proposed in [7] . Specifically, the algorithm consists of the following two steps. The first step is to find a partitioning scheme of the d-dimensional space, where d is the number of attributes in the quasi-identifier, such that each partition contains more than k records. In order to find such a partitioning, the algorithm recursively splits a partition at the median value (of a selected dimension) until no more split is allowed with respect to the k-anonymity requirement. Note that contrast to the previous algorithm, this algorithm is a top-down search approach, and the quality of the search relies on the following property ¶ : given a partition p, if p does not satisfy the k-anonymity requirement, then any sub-partition of p does not satisfy the requirement.
Observation 5. Given a partition p of records, if p is vulnerable to any inference attack, then so is any sub-partition of p.
Suppose that we have a partition P1 of the dataset, in which some records are vulnerable to inference attacks. Then, any further cut of P1 will lead to a dataset that is also vulnerable to inference attacks. This is based on the fact that any further cut on P1 leads to de-generalization of the dataset; thus, it reveals more information about each record than P1. Based on this observation, we modify the algorithm in [7] as follow. In each step of partition, in addition to checking the (k, c)-anonymity requirement, we also checks for the vulnerability to inference. If either check fails, then we do not need to further partition the data.
EXPERIMENTS
The main goal of our experiments is to show that our approach effectively prevents the previously discussed inference attacks when data is incrementally disseminated. We also show that our approach produces datasets with good data quality. We first describe our experimental settings and then report our experimental results.
§ This property is also used in [8] for ℓ-diversity and is thus applicable for (k, c)-anonymity. ¶ It is easy to see that the property also holds for any diversity requirement.
Experimental Setup

Experimental Environment
The experiments were performed on a 2.66 GHz Intel IV processor machine with 1 GB of RAM. The operating system on the machine was Microsoft Windows XP Professional Edition, and the implementation was built and run in Java 2 Platform, Standard Edition 5.0. For our experiments, we used the Adult dataset from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository [9] , which is considered a de facto benchmark for evaluating the performance of anonymization algorithms. Before the experiments, the Adult data set was prepared as described in [1, 5, 7] . We removed records with missing values and retained only nine of the original attributes. In our experiments, we considered {age, work class, education, marital status, race, gender, native country, salary} as the quasi-identifier, and occupation attribute as the sensitive attribute.
Data quality metrics
The quality of generalized data has been measured by various metric. In our experiment, we measure the data quality mainly based on Average Information Loss (AIL, for short) metric proposed in [2] . The basic idea of AIL metric is that the amount of generalization is equivalent to the expansion of each equivalence class (i.e., the geometrical size of each partition). Note that as all the records in an equivalence class are modified to share the same quasi-identifer, each region indeed represents the generalized quasi-identifier of the records contained in it. Thus, data distortion can be measured naturally by the size of the region covered by each equivalence class. Following this idea, IL measures the amount of data distortion in an equivalence class as follows. where |e| is the number of records in e, and |Dj| the domain size of attribute aj. |Gj| represents the amount of generalization in attribute aj (e.g., the length of the shortest interval which contains all the aj values existing in e).
Based on IL, the average information loss of a given table T is computed as: AIL( T ) = ( È e∈ T IL(e)) / |T |. The key advantage of AIL metric is that it precisely measures the amount of generalization (or vagueness of data), while being independent from the underlying generalization scheme (e.g, anonymization technique used or generalization hierarchies assumed). For the same reason, we also use the Discernibility Metric (DM ) [1] as another quality measure in our experiment. Intuitively, DM measures the quality of anonymized data based on the size of the equivalence classes, which indicates how much records are indistinguishable from each other.
Experimental Results
We first measured how many records were vulnerable in statically anonymized datasets with respect to the inference attacks we discussed. For this, we modified two kanonymization algorithms, Incognito [6] and Mondrian [7] , and used them as our static (k, c)-anonymization algorithms. Using these algorithms, we first anonymized 5K records and obtained the first "published" datasets. We then generated five more subsequent datasets by adding 5K more records each time. Then we used our vulnerability detection algorithms to count the number of records among these datasets that are vulnerable to each of inference attack. Figure 12 shows the result. As shown, much more records were found to be vulnerable in the datasets anonymized by Mondrian. This is indeed unsurprising, as Mondrian, taking a multidimensional approach, produces datasets with much less generalization. In fact, for Incognito, even the initial dataset was highly generalized. This clearly illustrates the unfortunate reality; that is, the more precise data are, the more vulnerable they are to undesirable inferences. The next step was to investigate how effectively our approach would work with a real dataset. The main focus was its effect on the data quality. As previously discussed, in order to prevent undesirable inferences, one needs to hide more information. In our case, it means that the given data must be generalized until there is no vulnerability to any type of inference attack. We modified the static (k, c)-anonymization algorithms as discussed in Section 5 and obtained our inf-checked (k, c)-anonymization algorithms. Note that although we implemented the full-featured algorithms for difference and intersection attacks, we took a simple approach for record-tracing attack. That is, we considered all the edges without removing infeasible/unnecessary edges as discussed in Section 4.5. We also implemented a merge approach where we anonymize each dataset independently and merge it with the previously released dataset. Although this approach is secure from any type of inference attacks, we expected that the data quality would be the With these algorithms as well as the static anonymization algorithms, we repeated our experiment. As before, we started with 5K records and increased the dataset by 5K each time. We then checked the vulnerability and measured the data quality of such datasets. We measured the data quality both with AIL and DM , and the results are illustrated in Figures 13 and 14 , respectively. It is clear that in terms of data quality the inf-checked algorithm is much superior than the merge algorithm. Although the static algorithms produced the best quality datasets, these data are vulnerable to inference attacks as previously shown. The datasets generated by our inf checked algorithm and the merge algorithm were not vulnerable to any type of inference attack.
We also note that the quality of datasets generated by the inf-checked algorithm is not optimal. This was mainly due to the complexity of checking for difference attack. Even though our heuristics to reduce the size of subsets (see Section 4.3) were highly effective in most cases, there were some cases where the size of subsets grew explosively. As such cases not only caused lengthy execution times, they caused memory blow-ups. In order to avoid such cases, we set an upper limit threshold for the size of subsets in this experiment. For example, while our modified algorithm of Incognito is processing a node in the generalization lattice, if the size of subsets needed to be checked exceeds the threshold, we stop the iteration and consider the node as a vulnerable node. Similarly, when we encounter such a case while considering a split in Mondrian, we stop the check and do not consider the split. Note that this approach does not af- fect the security of data, although it may negatively affect the overall data quality. Even if the optimality cannot be guaranteed, we believe that the data quality seems to be still acceptable, considering the results shown in Figures 13  and 14 .
Another important comparison was the computational efficiency of these algorithms. Figure 15 shows our experimental result for each algorithm. The merge algorithm is highly efficient with respect to execution time (although it was very inefficient with respect to data quality). As the merge algorithm anonymizes the same sized dataset each time and merging datasets can be done very quickly, the execution time is closely constant. While equipped the heuristics and the data structure discussed in Sections 4.3 and 5.1, the infchecked algorithm is still slow. However, considering the previously discussed results, we believe that this is the price you have to pay for better data quality and reliable privacy. Also, when compared to our previous implementation without any heuristics, this is a very promising result.
RELATED WORK
While static anonymization has been extensively investigated in the past few years [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11] , only a few approaches address the problem of anonymization in dynamic environments.
In [12] , Sweeney identified possible inferences when new records are inserted and suggested two simple solutions. The first solution is that once records in a dataset are anonymized and released, in any subsequent release of the dataset, the records must be the same or more generalized. As previously mentioned, this approach may suffer from un- necessarily low data quality. Also, this approach cannot protect newly inserted records from difference attack, as discussed in Section 4. The other solution suggested is that once a dataset is released, all released attributes (including sensitive attributes) must be treated as the quasi-identifier in subsequent releases. This approach seems reasonable as it may effectively prevent linking between records. However, this approach has a significant drawback in that every equivalence class will inevitable have a homogeneous sensitive attribute value; thus, this approach cannot adequately control the risk of attribute disclosure.
Yao et al. [15] addressed the inference issue when a single table is released in the form of multiple views. They proposed several methods to check whether or not a given set of views violates the k-anonymity requirement collectively. However, they did not address how to deal with such violations. Recently, Wang and Fung [13] further investigated this issue and proposed a top-down specialization approach to prevent record-linking across multiple anonymous tables. However, their work does not address how to protect records that are newly inserted to the dataset.
Recently, Wang and Fung [13] further investigated this issue and proposed a top-down specialization approach to prevent record-linking across multiple anonymous tables. However, their work focuses on the horizontal growth of databases (i.e., addition of new attributes), and does not address vertically-growing databases where records are inserted.
In [3] , we presented a preliminary limited investigation concerning the inference problem of dynamic anonymization with respect to incremental datasets. We identified some inferences and also proposed an approach where new records are directly inserted to the previously anonymized dataset for computational efficiency. However, compared to this current work, our previous work has several limitations.The key differences of this work with respect to [3] are as follows. In [3] , we focused only on the inference enabling sets that may exist between two tables, while in this work we consider more robust and systematic inference attacks in a collection of released tables. The inference attacks discussed in this work subsume attacks using inference enabling sets and address more sophisticated inferences. For instance, our study of the record-tracing attack is a new contribution in this work. We also provide a detailed descriptions of attacks and algorithms for detecting them. Our previous approach was also limited to the multidimensional generalization. By contrast, our current approach considers and is applicable to both the full-domain and multidimensional approaches; therefore it can combined with a large variety of anonymization algorithms. In this paper we also address the issue of computational costs in detecting possible inferences. We discuss various heuristics to significantly reduce the search space, and also suggest a scheme to store the history (of previously released tables).
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed inference attacks against the anonymization of incremental data. In particular, we discussed three basic types of cross-version inference attacks and presented algorithms for detecting each attack. We also presented some heuristics to address the efficiency of our algorithms. Based on these ideas, we developed secure anonymization algorithms for incremental datasets using two existing anonymization algorithms. We also empirically evaluated our approach by comparing to other approaches. Our experimental result showed that our approach outperformed other approaches in terms of privacy and data quality.
For the future work, we are working on essential properties (e.g, correctness) of our methods and analysis. Another interesting direction for the further work is to see if there are other types of inferences. For instance, one can devise an attack where more than one type of inference are jointly utilized. We also plan to investigate inference issues in more dynamic environments where deletions and updates of records are allowed.
